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The ground was furrowed and the seed was sown broadcast, when George Fox came to Rhode Island in 1672, to nourish and to garner in the crop. Early in his visit he crossed the Bay to Narragansett and held his first meeting, probably at Jireh Bull's block-house on Tower Hill. Four years later, at the same place, the forces of Massachusetts and Connecticut mustered and moved out to crush the great tribe of Narragansetts in the swamp fight. The bloody track of the Puritans and the gentle way of the Quakers crossed on the beautiful slopes of Tower Hill. We could not have a state without the one, nor any liveable society without the equivalent of the other.

The Narragansett meeting extended its outposts over the whole South County, and even to Stonington in Connecticut. Miss Hazard tells its story in seven topical chapters. The aspirations of the spirit were heavenly, the meddling of the "overseers" was something worse than earthly. To "Deal timely with such as walk Disorderly" meant mischief. The Friends dominated Narragansett in the eighteenth century, and they frowned upon the courts and legal methods, as they did upon all the functions of an established state. Yet probably there was never a more litigious community than was developed there.

About 1761, they received a manuscript copy of the English book of discipline, which became the basis of their action. There was a deep beneath a deep in matters spiritual, which the "New Lights" claimed to fathom. Two Friends dealt with a man who "has lately joined in their (the Separates') Worship so far as to Stand up with his Hatt off in the Time of their Praying." Persecution built up the Friends as a sect; when it ceased their system waned.

We may regret that these records yield no more matter of direct historical interest. The accomplished author has drawn out the best. It is mostly an account of narrow domestic life and petty discipline. The high spiritual ideal of Friends of the seventeenth century could not stem the invading influence of a widening civilization.

W. B. W.

*The Story of the Revolution.* By HENRY CABOT LODGE. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1898. Two vols., pp. xv, 324; xii, 285.)

THIS work may be regarded as one of the latest contributions to the gratification of the prevailing taste in our country for military stories and pictures. It is dedicated however to what may be considered even in these warlike times as a special class: "The Army and Navy of the United States, victors of Manila, Santiago, and Porto Rico, worthy successors of the soldiers and sailors who under the lead of George Washington won American independence."

Neither service will expect to find the literary work of a civilian, however accomplished he may be as a writer and a statesman, replete with lessons in strategy and tactics or military policy. One should not

be surprised to find in the first volume of this work a list of illustrations covering six pages followed by a list of maps that does not take as many lines; and in the second volume a three-page list of illustrations without any mention of a map. The second volume does however contain three maps. The work is devoid of any general map of the colonies or of the British possessions in North America. The illustrations are mostly works of the imagination or out of date. No references or authorities are given. Figures and dates are scarce.

The reader will be charmed with the author's graphic and vigorous, often eloquent language. But he may be influenced by it to pass over unscanned or unquestioned statements of doubtful meaning or correctness. Referring to the beginning of the war, "The First Blow," the author says (I. 27, 28), "If one wishes to explode a powder magazine it is sensible to fire the train which leads to it. But if one does not desire to explode gunpowder, it is prudent not to throw lighted matches about in its immediate neighborhood. The British acted on the superficial aspect of the case without considering ultimate possibilities and results. They kept lighting matches to see whether the explosive substances under their charge were all right and finally they dropped one in the magazine." In literal terms this would read about as follows: The British continually resorted to arbitrary force to assure themselves that the colonists would resent it and at last certain colonists resented it with force and so set the country in revolution. This is certainly a novel explanation of the way in which the war commenced. In every case of revolution or rebellion the government in power has to choose between force and diplomacy. If it chooses diplomacy, it must not, for the time being, resort to force. If the revolutionists prepare to use force, the government should content itself with making similar preparations, keeping pace with the enemy, and if possible getting a little ahead of him. Such was Lincoln's policy at the beginning of our civil war and such McKinley's or Otis's at the beginning of our present war in the Philippines. The responsibility for the first blow in each case was thrown upon the enemy. The British, on the other hand, precipitated the war of American revolution by trying to get possession of a paltry supply of muskets and gunpowder which they could have offset by the cargo of a single transport and of a couple of leaders whom, for the time being, they should have regarded as purely political factors in a purely political contest.

The diplomatic side of the war is treated clearly, fully, and brilliantly. The political side is made equally interesting and impressive, but in one respect seems incomplete, for the author says nothing about the machinery by which the first Congress had been called into being or by which the governments of the several colonies were transformed into governments of independent states. He hardly refers to a committee or council of safety or a convention. But the political essence, the great central fact, of the revolution, the Declaration of Independence, he discourses on in his most felicitous and most effective style. His discussion of Jefferson's conception and literary execution of the Declaration of Indepen-

dence is a combination of feeling and logic, which, like the noble subject of which it treats, should be read by every one who wants to be thrilled with "the spirit of '76." A specially effective piece of description is the chapter entitled "How Peace was made," in which the commanding character and intellect of Franklin are the salient features.

The author fails, as historians generally have done, to take a large enough view of the theatre of war. No one can justly appreciate the grand strategy of the Revolution without an appreciation of the geography of North America as determined by the Quebec Act. The advantage of the course and valley of the Hudson as a line of invasion is imperfectly indicated from a lack of appreciation, it would seem, of its location with reference to Europe on one side and the great Indian territory governed or controlled from Detroit on the other. That Great Britain relied upon communication with Europe and the co-operation of Indians was an important factor in its estimation of the strategic importance of the Hudson valley.

The author says: "The first military and political object of England when actual war came obviously would be to divide New England from the middle colonies by controlling the line of the Hudson River to the lakes lying on the border of Vermont and New York. The key of the position [he must mean for the British] was the fortress of Ticonderoga which commanded the lakes and in this way the road from Canada to New York harbor." In reality Ticonderoga, a point on the line formed by Lake Champlain, Lake George and the Hudson, simply blocked the passage up and down the natural line of travel and operation. It did not cover either the lakes or the Hudson against an attack either from the East or West. It could not prevent a passage across the great line of intended partition. It did not command that line in any sense that entitles it to be called "the key of the position." Nor was the line in question a "position." To call it one is to betray a misconception of the plan of operation. It was the line by which the territory of the revolted colonists was to be cut in two, but it was not simply to be won and held. Moreover, the isolation of New England, if accomplished, would not have crippled it, and would have been but the beginning of its conquest and subjugation. The experience of the North in isolating the greater part of the South in the Civil War and proceeding to conquer it shows about how far isolation goes toward breaking the spirit and destroying the resources of a people.

It is great injustice to Burgoyne to say, as the author does (I. 230), that the British ministry gave him everything that he wanted. It did not within 25 per cent. give him the force which he wanted, and asked for, and represented as necessary.

Schuyler and Gates are compared with each other and, as usual with historians, to the advantage of Schuyler. Into the merits of this comparison it is not worth while to go. Whether or not Gates was as good a soldier as Schuyler, he was not such an "old woman" as certain historians try to make him out. Ever since the history of our Revolutionary

war began to be written, Gates has been held up to scorn and contempt because at the first battle of Saratoga he did not reinforce Arnold so as to enable him to win a decisive victory. Gates had his army in a position of his own choice which had been skilfully and laboriously prepared for defence. Arnold, seeing the enemy approach, could not control his impatience for a fight. He sent out Morgan's riflemen and some light infantry to check him. The advance-guard affair thus brought about should, according to most critics of the battle, have determined Gates to abandon his intrenchments, come down from the commanding ground on which he stood, plunge into the low-lying woods through which the British were advancing, and engage in a general offensive operation. If these critics are right, Lee made a mistake in receiving Burnside's attack on the heights of Fredericksburg. He should have come down onto the flats that lined the Rappahannock and closed with the enemy there. Meade should not have waited at the ridge at Gettysburg for Pickett's division to work its bloody way up to his lines, but should have met it in the bottom of the valley. Thomas should not have remained at Nashville, while Hood was forcing Schofield back upon him; he should have abandoned his fortifications and gone to help Schofield win a decisive victory at Franklin. If Gates made a mistake on the occasion in question, it was in sending forward as many men as he did, and he probably did not send out any until he saw that his plan for a defensive action had been thwarted. Opprobrium has been heaped upon him for relieving Arnold afterwards from command. If Gates erred in this instance it was in not having Arnold court-martialed.

The author finds fault with Gates further as follows: "Instead of following up his advantage and attacking Burgoyne, he sat still and looked at him." When about three years later he threw himself, imperfectly prepared, upon the advancing enemy at Camden, and so sacrificed his army, was he not perhaps impelled by a recollection of the unreasonable criticism of his caution in the Saratoga campaign? When an enemy is cornered or invested, there are two ways of disposing of him or killing him off, one by bombardment, fusillade, or assault, in short, by destruction, one by depriving him of food and water, in short, by starvation. Destruction works quicker than starvation, but, except in point of time is more costly. What is more important, it involves a large element of chance, while starvation is absolutely certain. Great commanders have generally favored a combination of both methods, placing their chief reliance, however, in starvation. Such were Gates's tactics, when he had Burgoyne surrounded at Saratoga, and it is confidently asserted that no one in his place could have subjected the enemy to greater discomfort of mind and body than he did.

The author foregoes all allusion to our breach of the "convention" which Gates made with Burgoyne, and leaves the reader under the impression that the officers and men who surrendered and agreed not to serve again against America were allowed, as the convention stipulated, to go to England, and set an equal force free for service in America.

The point of the whole story, the net military result of the campaign, is thus imperfectly presented.

American as well as British historians have severely condemned the action of Congress in repudiating the stipulation that the British prisoners should be allowed to return to England. Congress had the right to review the agreement made by its general, and it was their duty to approve or disapprove of it as might seem to them to the interest of the people whom they represented. Burgoyne should have known or understood that the convention was not a perfect compact until ratified by Congress, and that if he anticipated its ratification or approval, he did so at his own risk.

Gates is justly criticized for giving Burgoyne the terms which he did instead of insisting upon unconditional surrender. He gave Burgoyne substantially the terms which Shafter gave Toral at Santiago, but he was not justified by either of the two facts in Shafter's case that the Americans commanded the sea, and that the terms were approved by the President before they were finally settled. It may, however, be questioned, whether Gates's concession was due as the author implies (I. 258) to lack of force or aggressiveness. It seems to have been due simply to imperfect apprehension or consideration of the element of sea-power in the enemy's case.

The Results of Saratoga form an interesting chapter on foreign relations and diplomacy. The next chapter, "Fabius," which closes the first volume, is devoted chiefly to the operations of Washington's army during the campaign at Saratoga, and carries the war on to the battle of Monmouth. The importance of Washington's achievement, preventing both Clinton and Howe from helping Burgoyne, is properly dwelt upon. The author says of Howe (I. 282) "He was not thinking of Burgoyne, did not understand the overwhelming importance of that movement. . . ." The real cause of Howe's inaction with reference to Burgoyne was his confident belief that Burgoyne would not need his assistance, provided that Schuyler, whom he thought throughout the operations in question to be in command, was not assisted by Washington. Howe meant by his movement on Philadelphia to keep Washington, if possible, from joining Schuyler, and if not, to give up Philadelphia and go after Washington. He meant to attract Washington or to follow him and neutralize him, wherever he might go. As both Washington and Schuyler were between Howe and Burgoyne, Howe's plan was radically defective. Howe could hardly keep Washington from slipping away and joining Schuyler in time to crush Burgoyne before Howe could interfere. Much less could he prevent Washington from detaching fractions of his army to reinforce the Northern army. That Howe's plan, as regards Washington, had the appearance of working well, was due to the fact that Washington confidently believed that Schuyler did not need his assistance. Hence neither Washington nor Howe allowed his attention to be diverted from the other by occurrences in the North.

The author inveighs against the "inhuman scheme" of employing Indians to ravage the frontier and raid the settlements, but does not allude

to the fact that the colonists tried to employ Indians against the British and did so about as far as they were able. He might have contented himself with remarking that the general military situation made it impossible for the colonists to reach the enemy's country, and that there was a difference in the use of savages between leading or inciting against regular troops and turning them loose upon old men, women and children.

The second volume opens with an account of Clark's expedition, in which the author ascribes to Clark the fact that "when the treaty of peace was made at Paris, the boundary of the United States went to the Lakes on the North and to the Mississippi on the West," and closes with a discussion of the meaning of the American Revolution, in which he recognizes and endorses our present policy of expansion. An appendix is made up of the Declaration of Independence, the Treaty of Paris, and Washington's Address on resigning his commission. There is a full index.

JOHN BIGELOW, JR.

*The Constitution of the United States; A Critical Discussion of its Genesis, Development and Interpretation.* By JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, LL.D., late Professor of Constitutional and International Law and Equity, Washington and Lee University. Edited by HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, Professor of Constitutional and International Law and Equity, Washington and Lee University. (Chicago: Callaghan and Co. 1899. Two vols., pp. xxviii, 518; v, 519-1015).

THE author of these volumes was born in Virginia in 1823, and died in 1897. He belonged to the generation of the Civil War and to the younger set of men who witnessed an attempt at secession and its failure. During his life he occupied a prominent position as a lawyer and a public man. He was at one time attorney-general of Virginia, for twelve years a representative in Congress and for some years before his death a professor in Washington and Lee University. The manuscript of this work, left unfinished by the author, was edited by his son. The volumes contain fourteen chapters, but may be reasonably divided into three parts. The first is within the domain of political science or political philosophy; the second part is somewhat historical in character, dealing with the origin of the constitutions of England and the United States; the third part is a discussion of the principles of constitutional law.

The work has many faults, some of which, probably the majority, are attributable to the fact that the author seems not to have revised his manuscript and that the editor has not corrected even palpable and obvious errors. If the editor had the right to turn over to the publisher his father's unfinished work, he certainly ought to have had the right to correct conspicuous blunders which it must be presumed the author himself would not have suffered to stand. Perhaps some of the errors are due to inefficient proof-reading and did not appear in the copy at all;